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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Is the testimony of a medical doctor sufficient in a mal-
practice case against a podiatrist to raise an issue of fact 
regarding violation of the applicable standard of care, where 
the medical doctor admits that he does not know what the 
standard of care ordinarily exercised by podiatrists is? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
There are no authorities which respondent believes to be 
directly determinative of any of the issues presented in this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff has appealed from the district court's order 
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Mott based on 
plaintiff's inability to produce competent expert testimony in 
support of her claim against defendant Mott. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
On October 24, 1984, respondent moved for summary judgment 
and for sanctions based on alleged bad faith of appellant 
during discovery. (R. 284-85.) The district court granted the 
motion for summary judgment on December 20, 1984 (R. 302), and 
entered summary judgment in favor of respondent on January 9, 
1985. (R. 322-23.) On January 29, 1985, the district court 
certified the judgment as final for purposes of appeal, pursu-
ant to Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. (R. 337.) The notice of appeal was 
filed February 21, 1985. (R. 338.) 
Statement of Facts 
This is an action alleging professional malpractice. 
Defendant Mott is a podiatrist who treated plaintiff between 
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May 12 and June 3, 1980. Plaintiff claims Dr. Mott failed to 
diagnose peripheral vascular disease. (R. 2-4.) 
The pretrial history of this case is a mockery. Defendant 
Mott was required to file five motions to compel or dismiss to 
obtain basic information about plaintiff's claims and the iden-
tification of her expert witnesses. On October 25, 1983, the 
court heard Mott's third motion to compel and held a pretrial 
conference. The following was ordered: 
1. Plaintiff had ten days to answer defendant's 
Interrogatories or the case would be dismissed. 
2. Plaintiff had fifteen days to designate expert 
witnesses. 
3. Trial was set for January 9, 1984. 
(R. 154.) On November 21, 1983, an order of dismissal was 
entered because plaintiff had not answered the interroga-
tories. (R. 157.) Plaintiff had also failed to designate 
expert witnesses. 
In December, 1983, plaintiff filed a motion for relief from 
the order of dismissal. (R. 162.) In support of her motion, 
plaintiff filed her affidavit stating she would respond to the 
interrogatories and designate an expert witness within thirty 
days. (R. 159-61.) In February, 1984, sixty days after plain-
tiff filed the affidavit, she still had not answered the inter-
rogatories or designated expert witnesses. At the hearing on 
plaintiff's motion for relief the court ordered the following: 
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1. Plaintiff's motion for relief was continued to 
March 1, 1984. 
2. Plaintiff was allowed until March 1, 1984, to 
file an affidavit by an expert witness establishing a 
prima facie case of negligence against each defendant, 
or the motion for relief would be denied. (R. 168-69.) 
On March 1, 1984, plaintiff filed the affidavit of Douglas 
Lake, M.D. (R. 172-74.) The affidavit stated that Dr. Lake 
had examined the records of each defendant and in his opinion 
each was negligent in the care provided plaintiff. Accord-
ingly, under the court's prior ruling, plaintiff's motion for 
relief was granted and the order of dismissal vacated. 
(R. 171.) 
On March 6, 1984, defendant Mott filed a motion to dismiss 
because plaintiff still had not answered the interrogatories 
which the court ordered plaintiff to answer within ten (10) 
days after October 25, 1983. (R. 177-78.) It was the plain-
tiff's failure to answer those same interrogatories on which 
the order of dismissal was based in November, 1983. On March 
8, 1984, plaintiff answered the interrogatories. (R. 180-84.) 
However, in answer to Interrogatory No. 3, which asked whether 
plaintiff intended to call Dr. Lake as an expert witness at 
trial, plaintiff answered "Not decided." 
On March 28, 1984, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied 
and another pretrial conference was held. At that time, plain-
tiff was ordered to designate all witnesses by April 10, 1984. 
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The court expressly ordered that witnesses not so identified 
would not testify at trial. (R. 188.) 
On April 10, 1984, plaintiff designated witnesses. Douglas 
Lake, William H. Fleming, Brian Burns, Douglas Flegal and 
Irving Yale were designated, presumably as expert witnesses as 
they had no factual involvement in the case. (R. 193-94.) On 
April 16, 1984, defendants served an interrogatory on plaintiff 
requesting information concerning the witnesses listed. 
(R. 211.) By July, 1984, plaintiff still had not responded to 
the interrogatory and defendant filed another motion to 
compel. (R. 234-35.) 
Eventually, plaintiff answered the interrogatory and stated 
she would not call Brian Burns or Douglas Flegal. Brian Burns 
is a chiropractor. Douglas Flegal is a podiatrist who had 
never been contacted by plaintiff or her counsel. After defen-
dant Mott's counsel noticed the deposition of Douglas Lake in 
May, 1984, plaintiff's counsel advised by letter dated May 22, 
1984, that Douglas Lake would not be called as an expert 
witness at trial. (R. 273.) It later appeared that, despite 
the statement in the affidavit that Dr. Lake had reviewed 
Dr. Mott's records and had determined that Dr. Mott was negli-
gent, Dr. Lake had never reviewed any of Dr. Mott's records. 
(R. 274-75.) 
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Irving Yale was a podiatrist who practiced in Connecticut. 
He passed away on April 2, 1983, over one year before plaintiff 
designated him as a trial witness. (R. 280-81.) The sole 
expert witness designated by plaintiff, who is still living and 
who her counsel has not represented will not be called, is 
Dr. William Fleming. 
Dr. Fleming's deposition was taken May 30, 1984. He testi-
fied that he had never seen Dr. Mott's medical records pertain-
ing to the plaintiff and that he does not know what the stan-
dard of care applicable to a podiatrist is. 
The admissible record before the court at the time of the 
motion thus consisted of the undisputed affidavits of 
Drs. Mott, Kimball and Beveridge. Dr. Mott referred plaintiff 
to Dr. Kimball, an orthopedist, for treatment. Dr. Kimball 
diagnosed peripheral vascular disease and an arterial occlu-
sion, and called in Dr. Beveridge, a vascular surgeon, for sur-
gery. Each doctor testified that he had treated the plaintiff, 
that he was familiar with the standard of care ordinarily exer-
cised by podiatrists in the Salt Lake area in 1980, and that in 
his opinion Dr. Mott had complied in all respects with that 
standard. (R. 276-77, 278-79, 282-83.) 
The following facts were established in the record before 
the court and were not controverted by any competent evidence: 
1. Dr. Mott is a podiatrist licensed to practice in 
the State of Utah. (R. 276.) 
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2. During May, 1980, Dr. Mott treated plaintiff for 
complaints of pain in her foot. (R. 277.) 
3. Dr. Mott's treatment and care of plaintiff 
complied in all respects with the standard of care 
ordinarily exercised by podiatrists in the Salt Lake 
community during 1980. (R. 276, 279, 283.) 
On October 24, 1984, Mott moved for summary judgment and 
for sanctions pursuant to Rule 56(g), U.R.C.P., which provides 
for sanctions against parties who file affidavits in bad 
faith. (R. 284-85.) Summary judgment in favor of defendant 
Mott was entered January 9, 1985 (R. 322-23), and was certified 
final pursuant to Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., on January 29, 1985. 
(R. 337.) The notice of appeal was filed February 21, 1985. 
(R. 338.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff in a professional malpractice case must 
produce competent expert testimony establishing the standard of 
care ordinarily followed by practitioners in the defendant's 
field of practice and that the defendant breached that standard 
of care. Plaintiff in this case has, despite numerous oppor-
tunities in the district court, failed to produce any competent 
expert testimony supporting her claim against Dr. Mott. 
Of the witnesses identified by plaintiff during discovery, 
Dr. Fleming is the only expert witness who is still living and 
whom plaintiff has represented will be called at trial. 
Dr. Fleming, however, admitted that he was not familiar with 
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the standard of care ordinarily followed by podiatrists, and 
thus cannot opine as to Dr. Mott's compliance with such stan-
dard. Further, Dr. Fleming has never reviewed Mott's records 
regarding plaintiff's treatment, and thus any testimony he may 
have given is without foundation. 
The issue in this case is not, as plaintiff argues, whether 
any medical doctor can testify in a professional malpractice 
case against a podiatrist. Rather, the issue is whether 
Dr. Fleming, who by his own admission does not know the appli-
cable standard of care, can so testify. 
The liability for professional malpractice is not measured 
by any uniform or absolute standard. Rather, it is predicated 
on the breach by the defendant of the standard ordinarily exer-
cised by practitioners in similar specialties in the commu-
nity. Thus, neither the fact that the training and licensing 
requirements for physicians and podiatrists partially overlap 
nor the fact that a physician can specialize in podiatry if he 
so chooses, provides any basis for allowing Dr. Fleming to 
opine as to application of a standard which he admits he does 
not know. 
The testimony of Dr. Lake is also insufficient to insulate 
plaintiff from summary judgment. Plaintiff does not assert in 
her brief that Dr. Lake's testimony should be considered, and 
the record demonstrates that Dr. Lake never reviewed Mott's 
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file. Rather, Dr. Lake gave his opinion without the benefit of 
review of the file because plaintiff's counsel had told him 
that his affidavit was needed immediately in order to retain 
her position in the suit. The affidavit was a sham and was 
properly disregarded. 
The record before the court, other than as identified 
above, consisted of the affidavits of three doctors, including 
Dr. Mott, each of whom had treated plaintiff, was familiar with 
the applicable standard of care and opined that Dr. Mott had 
complied therewith in all respects. In the face of such evi-
dence, the district court acted properly in granting summary 
judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
THERE WAS NO FACTUAL DISPUTE REGARDING 
DR. MOTT'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE 
STANDARD OF CARE. 
To make a prima facie case in a professional malpractice 
case, the plaintiff must present competent evidence establish-
ing: (1) the standard of care ordinarily exercised by other 
practitioners in the defendant's field of practice, (2) that 
the defendant departed from the applicable standard of care, 
and (3) that such departure proximately caused the injury. 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah 1980); Anderson v. 
Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943). 
-9-
These three elements of the plaintiff's prima facie case 
must be established by competent expert testimony. Marsh v. 
Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1959). It is 
not sufficient to merely show that an adverse result occurred. 
A physician is not an insurer or guarantor of results and no 
presumption or inference of negligence may be made from the 
mere fact of an adverse result. Marsh v. Pemberton, supra. 
The rationale for requiring expert testimony is compel-
ling. The issues presented by medical malpractice cases gener-
ally involve medical questions and medical judgments beyond the 
knowledge and experience of laymen. Without the assistance of 
expert medical testimony, the finder of fact is left to imper-
missibly base a verdict upon speculation and conjecture as to 
what standard of care was required and whether it was met. 
Anderson v. Nixon, supra. 
Summary judgment is appropriate to save time and expense 
for the parties and the court where the plaintiff in a medical 
malpractice case is unable to produce expert testimony which 
would establish a prima facie case. In Maxfield v. Fishier, 
538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a 
dismissal of a medical malpractice case prior to trial for 
failure to prosecute because of the plaintiff's inability to 
proffer expert testimony supporting the claims against the 
defendant doctor. 
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Similarly, in Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257 
(1931), the trial court was chided for allowing a medical mal-
practice case to go to the jury in the absence of any expert 
medical testimony supporting the plaintiff's claim. The 
Supreme Court stated the trial court should have directed a 
verdict in favor of the defendant when plaintiff failed to 
produce expert witnesses to establish his claim of negligence. 
The court held it was inappropriate to allow plaintiff to bring 
an action based upon mere conjecture, speculation or suspi-
cion. 2 P.2d at 263. 
In a similar case, the Washington State Appellate Court 
affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment based upon 
the plaintiff's failure to present any expert medical testimony 
showing the defendant had failed to comply with the applicable 
standard of care. The court held: "The plaintiff's failure to 
present essential expert medical testimony or at a minimum to 
demonstrate that such evidence would be available for trial, 
was sufficient justification for the trial court's summary 
judgment." Swanson v. Briqham, 18 Wash. App. 647, 571 P.2d 
217, 220 (1977). 
In the case at bar, plaintiff has offered absolutely no 
competent evidence supporting her claim against Dr. Mott. The 
only evidence in the record which plaintiff can cite as support 
for her position is the deposition testimony of Dr. Fleming 
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and the affidavit of Dr. Lake. As will be shown below, that 
evidence was not sufficient to stand the test of summary judg-
ment, and the lower court's ruling should be affirmed. 
A. Dr. Fleming Is Not Qualified To Give Expert Medical 
Testimony Regarding The Standard Of Care To Be 
Followed By A Podiatrist. 
Plaintiff argues in her brief that the testimony of 
Dr. William H. Fleming, a medical doctor (M.D.) in Oklahoma 
specializing in thoracic and vascular surgery (Fleming Depo. 
p. 4), is sufficient to establish the negligence of Dr. Mott, a 
doctor of podiatric medicine (D.P.M.). Plaintiff argues that a 
physician is qualified as a matter of law to give expert testi-
mony against a podiatrist. The correct issue, however, is not 
whether any physician can testify against a podiatrist, but 
rather is specifically whether plaintiff's expert in this case 
can so testify. 
It is unnecessary for the court to reach the issue argued 
by the plaintiff because Dr. Fleming, who does not purport to 
practice podiatry, admitted that he was unfamiliar with the 
standard of care applicable to podiatrists: 
Q. So correct me if I'm wrong, but you're willing to 
state that Dr. Mott violated a standard care 
applicable to him without even seeing his records? 
A. If he were a physician I could certainly say 
yes. I don't know what the standard of care is 
[sic] expected of a podiatrist is. 
(Fleming Depo. pp. 42-43). 
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Fleming's admission that he does not know the standard of 
care applicable to podiatrists renders any opinion he might 
have given inadmissible. In Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 
312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937), this court held that when a patient 
selects a practitioner in a particular field, he adopts and 
accepts the standard of care ordinarily followed by practi-
tioners in that field. 67 P.2d at 663. The standard of care 
followed by practitioners in other specialties is immaterial. 
Accordingly, Dr. Fleming's opinion regarding the standard of 
care ordinarily followed by medical doctors would be immaterial 
and inadmissible against this defendant. Because Dr. Fleming 
admitted that he did not know the standard of care applicable 
to a podiatrist, he was not qualified to give an opinion as to 
Dr. Mott's treatment. 
Even if Dr. Fleming were qualified to opine on the practice 
of podiatry, his testimony in this case was without the founda-
tion required under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Dr. Fleming admitted in his testimony that he had not reviewed 
any of Dr. Mott's records except for one bill: 
Q. Okay. Now, back to any other criticism you have 
of the care and treatment given to this patient. 
A. Okay. Dr. Mott—and, again, I have never seen 
any office records. I don't know what the man 
saw, what he wrote down. I have never been 
privied any records. This is the only thing I 
have on him, is a bill that lists three, six, 
seven, eight, nine, ten visits between 5/12 and 
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6/18, and indicating office visit, x-rays, cast, 
and some billing information. 
Q. Okay. Let me—maybe I can shortcut that then. 
You've never seen Dr. Mott's records? 
A. That's correct. 
(Fleming Depo. p. 41.) 
In Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979), this 
court summarized the prerequisites to the admission of expert 
testimony: 
The admissibility of [expert] evidence depends in 
large measure upon the foundation laid. The expertise 
of the witness, his degree of familiarity with the 
necessary facts, and the logical nexus between his 
opinion and the facts adduced must be established. 
When such a foundation is laid, Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence makes an expert's opinion admis-
sible, even though it embraces an ultimate issue. 
597 P.2d at 1331. In the case at bar, the necessary foundation 
was not present, and the testimony of Dr. Fleming was thus 
insufficient to withstand the test of summary judgment. See 
Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 
P.2d 538, 542 (1973) . 
Even if Dr. Fleming had not admitted that he did not know 
the standard of care applicable to podiatrists, his status as a 
physician would not alone qualify him to testify against a 
podiatrist. Rather, the party seeking to introduce this testi-
mony must establish that, through experience, training or 
observation, the witness has knowledge of the standard of care 
commonly practiced in defendant's specialty. 
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In Greene v. Thomas, 662 P.2d 491 (Colo. App. 1982), the 
plaintiff attempted to qualify a dermatologist to testify as to 
the standard of care for plastic surgeons. Preliminary testi-
mony, however, established that the dermatologist had never 
performed surgery such as that performed by a plastic surgeon 
on the plaintiff and that his knowledge of the standard of care 
for plastic surgeons was limited. 
Exclusion of the dermatologist's opinion was affirmed on 
appeal. The appellate court stated that: 
The plaintiff in a medical malpractice case must 
prove that the defendant specialist failed to meet the 
standard of care required of physicians in the same 
specialty practiced by the defendant. And, to qualify 
a witness as an expert on that standard of care, the 
party offering the witness must establish the wit-
ness's knowledge and familiarity with the standard of 
care and treatment commonly practiced by physicians 
engaged in the defendant's specialty. [Citations.] 
A number of jurisdictions have held that the 
expert witness must have acquired, through experience 
or study, more than just a casual familiarity with the 
standards of care in the defendant's specialty. 
Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Conn. 609, 356 A.2d 887 
(1975); Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326 
(1978); Ishler v. Miller, 56 Ohio St. P.2d 447, 384 
N.E.2d 296 (1978); Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 367 
A.2d 472 (1977). 
662 P.2d at 493. See also Carp v. Bumpus, 30 Colo. App. 144, 
491 P.2d 606 (1971) (medical doctor not qualified to testify 
against osteopath.) 
Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1937), 
cited by appellant is not to the contrary. In Walkenhorst, the 
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court allowed a medical doctor to testify against a chiroprac-
tor, but did so because it found that the chiropractor had gone 
beyond the specialty of chiropractic and was practicing medi-
cine. 67 P.2d at 666. The medical doctor, being familiar with 
the standard of care applicable to the practice of medicine in 
which the defendant had engaged, was thus qualified to tes-
tify. The case did not hold, as appellant asserts, that a 
general practitioner is qualified as a matter of law to testify 
as an expert witness in all fields of medicine regardless of 
actual familiarity with the applicable standard of care. 
Appellant's argument that the Utah statutory scheme re-
quires the court to hold as a matter of law that all physicians 
and surgeons are qualified to testify against podiatrists is 
without merit. Although licensed physicians and surgeons are 
authorized under the statute to practice podiatry, Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-5-12 (Supp. 1983), it does not necessarily follow 
that a physician or surgeon so licensed but not specializing in 
podiatry will have the requisite knowledge of the standard of 
care applicable to podiatrists, who undergo different training 
than medical doctors. Podiatrists go to podiatry school, not 
medical school, and earn the designation doctor of podiatric 
medicine (D.P.M.) not medical doctor (M.D.). This court in 
Walkenhorst, by determining whether the chiropractor in that 
case had engaged in the general practice of medicine with which 
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the medical doctor would be familiar, implicitly recognized 
that a medical doctor's qualification to testify against a 
doctor of another specialty is not automatic. Had appellant's 
position in this case been adopted in Walkenhorst, such a 
finding would have been unnecessary. 
The partial overlap in the training and statutory licensing 
requirements of physicians and podiatrists is simply insuffi-
cient standing alone to qualify a physician to testify as to 
the standard of care applicable to podiatrists. The liability 
for professional malpractice is not measured by any absolute or 
uniform standard; rather, such liability is predicated on 
breach of the standard ordinarily exercised by similar practi-
tioners in the local community. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 
348, 351 (Utah 1980). The standard is an actual standard drawn 
from practice, and knowledge thereof is not conferred by satis-
faction of the statutory licensing requirements alone. 
Mott does not contend that a medical doctor can never 
testify against a podiatrist, and that issue is not before the 
court. In an appropriate case, a medical doctor could qualify 
to give an opinion regarding whether a podiatrist has followed 
the standard of care ordinarily followed by podiatrists in the 
community. Indeed, in this case, Drs. Kimball and Beveridge, 
who testified by affidavit that Dr. Mott complied with the 
applicable standard, are medical doctors, not podiatrists. The 
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crucial difference between Dr. Fleming and Drs. Kimball and 
Beveridge is that Fleming admitted he was not familiar with the 
applicable standard of care, whereas Kimball and Beveridge 
testified that they were familiar with such standard. 
Dr. Fleming is a medical doctor specializing in thoracic 
and vascular surgery. He is not a podiatrist, and is not 
trained in podiatry. Further, he admits that he does not know 
the standard of care ordinarily exercised by podiatrists and 
admits that he has never reviewed Dr. Mott's records regarding 
the symptoms of the plaintiff or the treatment given her. 
Plaintiff was given ample opportunity to produce an expert 
qualified to opine as to the application of the standard of 
care in this case, but was unable to do so, making the motion 
for summary judgment timely and appropriate. See Strand v. 
Associated Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 
193-94 (Utah 1977). The district court thus acted properly in 
granting Dr. Mott's motion for summary judgment. 
B. The Affidavit of Dr. Lake Was A Sham And Was Properly 
Disregarded. 
Other than the deposition testimony of Dr. Fleming, the 
only evidence in this case ostensibly supporting plaintiff's 
claim against Dr. Mott is the affidavit of Douglas Lake, M.D. 
That affidavit, however, cannot be considered on the motion for 
summary judgment because plaintiff has represented that 
Dr. Lake will not be called as a trial witness. (R. 273.) 
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Plaintiff admits as much by not arguing from Lake's affidavit 
in her brief. Further, even if plaintiff had not represented 
that Lake would not be called, the record establishes that 
Dr. Lake's affidavit was a sham and was thus properly 
disregarded. 
In February, 1984, the district court ruled that it would 
vacate the order of dismissal entered in November, 1983 only if 
plaintiff filed an affidavit from an expert witness establish-
ing a prima facie case of negligence against each defendant by 
March 1, 1984. The affidavit filed by plaintiff to ostensibly 
comply with the court's order was the affidavit of Douglas 
Lake, M.D. (R. 172-74.) The sole qualification stated in 
Dr. Lake's affidavit was that he is a licensed physician with 
expertise in medicolegal evaluations. In fact, Dr. Lake does 
not presently practice medicine and when he did practice, his 
specialty was plastic surgery. (R. 183.) 
More misleading, however, are the statements in his affida-
vit that his conclusions were reached after careful review and 
that he had "examined the records of contact by each of the 
defendants and based thereon believets] that each and all of 
the named defendants failed to provide the appropriate care at 
the appropriate time, and that such failure represents a 
departure from the accepted standards of medical practice." 
(R. 173.) In fact, Douglas Lake had never reviewed or even 
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seen the records of Dr. Mott pertaining to the plaintiff. The 
records sent by Dr. Lake to Dr. Fleming did not include 
Dr. Mott's records, except for one bill. It became apparent 
and plaintiff's counsel admitted at the deposition of 
Dr. Fleming on May 30, 1984 that Dr. Lake had never received 
copies of Dr. Mott's medical records pertaining to plaintiff. 
(Fleming depo. pp. 21, 41.) 
The true nature of Dr. Lake's affidavit is disclosed in a 
letter dated February 24, 1984 to Douglas Lake, M.D. from the 
office of plaintiff's counsel. (R. 274-75.) The letter states: 
Dear Dr. Lake: 
You will recall our recent telephone conversations 
concerning the captioned case. You remarked that you 
could be "Horatio" in such instances wherein we need 
an immediate affidavit to retain our position in the 
lawsuit. 
In an effort to make your review less demanding, we 
have drafted an affidavit which we believe will 
satisfy our needs. . . . 
I shall be available to discuss any part of this on 
the telephone. We must have an affidavit in our hands 
by 10:00 AM the morning of March 1, 1984 (Thursday) 
and hope you can express the affidavit to us Tuesday 
night. 
Very truly yours, 
ANTHONY M. THURBER 
Bryant E. Hansen, Legal Assistant 
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Defendant had been requesting identification of plaintiff's 
expert witnesses through interrogatories and motions to compel, 
and the obvious intent of the court's February, 1984, order was 
to require plaintiff to file an affidavit establishing a prima 
facie case of negligence against each defendant by an expert 
witness who would be called at trial. It is clear that plain-
tiff never intended to call Dr. Lake as an expert witness. 
Rather, his affidavit was filed because plaintiff needed an 
immediate affidavit to retain her position in the lawsuit. 
More importantly, however, the affidavit misrepresents the 
foundation for Dr. Lake's opinion because it is clear that he 
never reviewed the records of Dr. Mott. For these reasons, the 
affidavit of Douglas Lake cannot insulate plaintiff from 
summary judgment. 
C. The Competent Evidence Establishes Dr. Mott's Compli-
ance With The Applicable Standard Of Care As A Matter 
Of Law. 
The affidavits of Drs. Kimball and Beveridge, the ortho-
pedist and the vascular surgeon who treated the plaintiff for 
an arterial occlusion following her treatment by Dr. Mott, and 
Dr. Mott's own affidavit are uncontroverted and establish that 
he complied in all respects with the standard of care ordinar-
ily followed by podiatrists in the Salt Lake community during 
1980. The district court's grant of summary judgment was 
therefore proper and should be affirmed. 
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Plaintiff half-heartedly asserts in her brief that 
"Dr. Mott himself admitted that he should have diagnosed plain-
tiff's peripheral vascular disease but inexplicably failed to 
do so." (Brief of Appellant, p. 7.) Examination of the pas-
sage in plaintiff's deposition which plaintiff cites as support 
for the alleged admission reveals the true nature of the 
alleged admission: 
A. Okay. I was having my therapy. I was in the 
tub, and Robert Blair had stepped out of the 
room. Dr. Mott came in. He asked me how I was 
doing, and I told him I wasn't doing too good. 
And he said, "Well, I'm sorry about this. I'm 
sorry I missed it." (Martin Depo. pp. 87-88.) 
Plainly, the alleged statement is not an admission that 
Dr. Mott failed to comply with the applicable standard of 
care. In order to establish a prima facie case to withstand 
the test of summary judgment, plaintiff was required to show by 
competent expert testimony that Dr. Mott violated the local 
standard of practice for podiatrists. Dr. Mott's alleged 
"admission" does neither. A jury could not have based a 
verdict on such a statement without competent expert testimony 
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257 (1931). The statement 
is more akin to a lawyer's apology to his client for losing a 
case; the apology does not establish that the lawyer committed 
professional malpractice. If such a statement alone were 
sufficient to withstand the test of summary judgment and get 
the case to the jury, the summary judgment procedure would be 
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eviscerated. The district court acted properly in granting the 
motion for summary judgment, and its action should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The treatment complained of in this case occurred over four 
years ago. The action has been pending for over three years 
and in spite of repeated extensions of deadlines, the plaintiff 
has been unable to proffer any expert testimony establishing 
the standard of care applicable to podiatrists or that Dr. Mott 
violated the applicable standard of care. Therefore, the trial 
court's grant of defendant Mott*s motion for summary judgment 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this /r day of July, 1985. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Rodney R. IParker 
Attorneys for Respondent Mott 
SCM1211G 
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